11 ideas
| 15545 | Armstrong's analysis seeks truthmakers rather than definitions [Lewis] |
| 21901 | 'Difference' refers to that which eludes capture [Deleuze, by May] |
| 15546 | Predications aren't true because of what exists, but of how it exists [Lewis] |
| 15548 | Say 'truth is supervenient on being', but construe 'being' broadly [Lewis] |
| 14399 | Presentism says only the present exists, so there is nothing for tensed truths to supervene on [Lewis] |
| 21908 | Ontology can be continual creation, not to know being, but to probe the unknowable [Deleuze] |
| 21902 | 'Being' is univocal, but its subject matter is actually 'difference' [Deleuze] |
| 21903 | Ontology does not tell what there is; it is just a strange adventure [Deleuze, by May] |
| 21904 | Being is a problem to be engaged, not solved, and needs a new mode of thinking [Deleuze, by May] |
| 15543 | How do things combine to make states of affairs? Constituents can repeat, and fail to combine [Lewis] |
| 20544 | Berlin distinguishes 'negative' and 'positive' liberty, and rejects the latter [Berlin, by Swift] |